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ABSTRACT  
 
GPS spoofing is a hot topic of late; technical discus-
sions vary widely based upon the assumed capabilities 
and a priori knowledge of the spoofer. For a single GPS 
receiver, various methods to detect a spoofing event have 
been proposed in the literature. These range from simple 
ideas (e.g. monitoring the power levels of the GPS sig-
nals) to more complex concepts (e.g. looking for vestigial 
peaks in the correlator outputs) to the comparison to non-
GPS signals (e.g. an IMU).  Much of this prior work has 
been on the conceptual level with limited experimenta-
tion; little appears to have been done to analyze the result-
ing detection performance.  
 
The detector of interest here monitors the GPS sig-
nals using not one, but two or more receivers with their 
antennas at known relative positions. The assumption is 
that during a spoofing event these multiple receivers will 
receive the same spoofer RF signal in that the satellites’ 
characteristics (i.e. relative times of arrival) are identical 
at all of the antennas. With no spoofer present, each an-
tenna would receive a unique RF signal, consistent with 
its position in space. The concept of the detector, then, is 
that the presence of spoofing is discernible from the near 
equivalence of the receivers’ receptions. While one could 
compare these multiple receptions at the RF level, we 
compare the position solutions across receivers, declaring 
a spoofing event if the resulting position solutions are too 
close to each other as compared to the (known) relative 
locations of the antennas. The primary advantage of such 
an approach is that the hypothesis test does not require 
receiver hardware modification or even access to software 
GPS methods; a separate processor could easily monitor 
the positions output from the receivers.  
 
In this paper we analyze such a detector from a 
Neyman-Pearson perspective assuming Gaussian statistics 
on the position solution data. We consider four cases: (1) 
two receivers with fixed (known) locations, (2) two re-
ceivers with fixed separation and known orientation (but 
unknown absolute position), (3) two receivers with fixed 
separation and unknown orientation, and (4) a three re-
ceiver example.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
The Global Positioning System (GPS) is well known 
to be an accurate provider of position and time infor-
mation across the globe. Consulting a dictionary, the term 
“spoof” or “spoofing” generally refers to a light-hearted 
deception. When combined together, GPS spoofing refers 
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to intentional (and considered malicious) interference of a 
GPS user’s inputs so as to distort the position and/or time 
information gained from the system.  
 
GPS spoofing is a hot topic of late; technical discus-
sions can vary widely based upon the assumed capabili-
ties and a priori knowledge of the spoofer. In 2003 Warn-
er and Johnston [1] suggested several possible methods to 
detect a spoofing event: monitoring the power levels of 
the GPS signals (absolute, relative, and across satellites), 
checking that the constellation itself is correct for the giv-
en time (e.g. number and IDs of the satellites), testing the 
accuracy of the clock component, and even checking 
against some non-GNSS source (e.g. an IMU). Since then 
various authors have experimented with spoofing and 
suggested detectors including correlating the P(Y) code at 
the RF level, looking for vestigial peaks in the correlator 
outputs, comparing to trusted reference signals, and using 
antenna arrays to spatially identify signals (see e.g. [2-
10]). Much of this prior work has been on the conceptual 
level with limited analysis of the resulting detection per-
formance.  
 
In this paper we examine a spoofing detection con-
cept and attempt to assess its performance. We assume 
that the spoofer, with only one broadcast antenna, has the 
ability to present a realistic, but incorrect RF signal at the 
user’s location; this would be possible currently using one 
of the inexpensive GPS simulators available on the mar-
ket. We also assume that the spoofer does not have the 
ability to interfere with the receiver itself; hence, this is 
spoofing by an external entity, not the operator of a vehi-
cle trying to deceive his/her local GPS.  
 
The detector of interest here monitors the GPS sig-
nals using not one, but two or more receivers with their 
antennas at known relative positions. The assumption is 
that during a spoofing event these multiple receivers will 
receive the same spoofer RF signal (since the spoofer can 
only create one) and that each satellite’s characteristic in 
this signal is identical at all of the antennas. With no 
spoofer present, each antenna would receive a unique RF 
signal consistent with its position in space. The concept of 
the detector, then, is that the presence of spoofing is dis-
cernible from the near equivalence of the receivers’ recep-
tions. A conceptual discussion of such a detector, and its 
ability to detect a single spoofer, was presented by 
Tippenhauer et al [11]. 
 
While one could compare these multiple receptions at 
the RF level (and several of the authors listed above have 
proposed such detection schemes), a simpler approach 
that could be implemented with existing GPS receivers 
would be to have each antenna/receiver compute its posi-
tion and compare the results across receivers. With such a 
detector, one could declare a spoofing event if the result-
ing position solutions are too close to each other as com-
pared to the known, perhaps relative, locations of the an-
tennas. The primary advantage of such an approach is that 
the hypothesis test does not require receiver hardware 
modification or even access to software GPS algorithms; 
a separate processor could easily monitor the positions 
output from the receivers. Given the uncertainty of the 
statistics of the signal generated by the spoofer, in this 
paper we describe the problem as a hypothesis test and 
analyze the detector from a Neyman-Pearson perspective. 
We note that our analysis might also be useful for spoof 
detection schemes based on comparing sequential posi-
tions of a vehicle with a single receiver traversing a 
known trajectory [12].  
 
Assuming m antenna/receiver pairs, the hypothesis 
test of no spoofer versus spoofer is based upon m sets of 
computed positions. Under the null hypothesis (no spoof-
er), each position solution corresponds to the actual an-
tenna position plus a random offset due to noise. Under 
the alternative hypothesis (spoofer present), the positions’ 
means would be equal across receivers and the noise sta-
tistics could be different. Assuming Gaussian statistics on 
the position solution offsets, we present detection and 
false alarm probabilities for several cases: (1) two anten-
nas with fixed (known) locations, (2) two antennas with 
fixed separation and known orientation (but unknown 
absolute position), (3) two antennas with fixed separation 
and unknown orientation, and (4) an example with three 
receivers/antennas.  
 
The organization of the paper is as follows: (1) we 
first review the terminology of the detection problem and 
present the assumed statistics of the data observed, (2) we 
present some experimental results as a sanity check of the 
assumptions of the data model, and (3) we develop detec-
tion procedures for the 4 distinct cases listed above. Rec-
ognizing that our efforts are initial and limited, we con-
clude with suggested directions for future work (some 
obvious and easy, some not so).   
 
 
HYPOTHESIS TESTING 
 
The development of an algorithm to recognize a 
spoofing event is an example of a binary hypothesis test. 
To describe our spoofing results, we will employ standard 
terminology to specify the test between two hypotheses, 
H0 and H1: 
 
H0:  no spoofer  
 
H1:  spoofer  
 
The detector decides for either H0 or H1 based upon some 
observed data. Usually this is implemented by evaluating 
some scalar function (called the test statistic) of the data, 
T(data), and comparing this value to a fixed value (called 
the threshold), λ. Common notation for this concept is  
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
1H
0H
)(dataT  
 
In this representation it is imagined that the test statistic is 
larger in value under the hypothesis H1; we can, and will 
below, occasionally reverse the directions of the threshold 
test when convenient.  
 
This form of detection approach results in a binary 
decision (H0 or H1, no third result such as “it cannot be 
determined” is allowed); hence, two types of errors are 
possible: 
 
 A false alarm occurs when the detector decides 
for H1, but H0 is actually true.  
 
 A miss occurs when the detector decides for H0, 
but H1 is actually true.   
 
Recognizing that each of these errors has different costs 
to the user, we might want to treat them differently. For 
example, a false alarm might mean waiting and attempt-
ing some task later on new data while a miss might have 
more dire consequences. As such, we follow the Neyman-
Pearson formulation of detection: 
 
 Set the level of the test, its probability of false 
alarm, pfa, to some allowable, but small value 
(often written as α): 
     0fa H|)(Pr dataTp  
 
 Try to maximize the power, or probability of de-
tection, pd, of the test where power is defined as 
one minus the probability of a miss 
  1missd H|)(Pr1  dataTpp  
 
As stated in the Introduction above, the data available 
for the detection method is the (assumed simultaneous) 
position estimates from a set of m GPS receivers. For 
convenience, we assume that each of these 3-dimenional 
vectors is available in a common east, north, up (ENU) 
reference frame; so that we have the vector observations  
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for k ranging over 1 to m (we use hats on variables to in-
dicate that they are noisy estimates). For most of the work 
below we will consider two receivers, so k = 1 or 2.  
 
To develop and analyze detectors, we need to specify 
the statistics of the data under the two hypotheses.  For 
simplicity, we will make the assumption that the estima-
tion error is Gaussian (due to assumptions of Gaussian 
receiver noise and/or the linear nature of the position so-
lution algorithms); the specifics of the model vary under 
the two hypotheses as follows: 
 
 Under H0 (no spoofing), the mean of each posi-
tion estimate is the true position of the receiver’s 
antenna (no hats) 
 
 
 
 
  kk
k
k
k
k
k
k
u
n
e
uE
nE
eE
E pp 


















ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
0
0
0
0  
 
The covariance matrix for each kpˆ is some nom-
inal matrix 0  (due to local noise, satellite 
DOP, etc) and is independent of k since the re-
ceivers are assumed to be near each other. Final-
ly, the estimates across the different receivers are 
assumed independent; in other words, the cross 
covariance matrix for  jpˆ  and  kpˆ  is a 3-by-3 
zero matrix. 
 
 Under H1 (spoofing), the mean of each position 
estimate is an unknown position, ps, determined 
by the spoofer 
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Of significance is that this mean is independent 
of k (!), all receivers “see” the same position. 
Further, the covariance matrix for each kpˆ is de-
termined by the spoofer and is unknown to the 
GPS user; we will employ the notation 1 . As 
was stated for H0, we will assume that this within 
receiver covariance is independent of k. Finally, 
the cross covariance matrix for  jpˆ  and  kpˆ  is 
written as jk1  and may not be zero as it was 
under H0. 
 
 
A SANITY CHECK ON THE MODEL 
 
While a Gaussian model is a good place to start an 
examination of a problem such as this (hopefully to lead 
to tractable results), it is natural to wonder about the stat-
ed assumptions on the means and covariances. Toward 
that end we experimented with a pair of GPS sensors at 
the Coast Guard Academy. To assess the no spoofer hy-
pothesis,  H0, we mounted the receivers at a known sepa-
ration (approximately 20 feet) on a rooftop and collected 
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several days of data (at a rate of 1-second updates). For 
spoofing, we brought the same receivers indoors and em-
ployed a commercial GPS reradiator (the equivalent of a 
meaconing spoofer) and collected another data set of 
similar size. The feed of this reradiator was also on the 
rooftop, in between the two receiver positions for the no 
spoofer test. The observation, then, is a series of 6 dimen-
sional position vectors: 
  Tuneune 222111 ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ  
 
From this data set, we examined the usual navigation per-
formance via the horizontal scatter and then some basic 
statistics. 
 
First, Figure 1 shows the horizontal (east and north) 
scatter for the rooftop test, no spoofer. The two receivers 
were mounted with an almost north-south orientation. The 
average position of the  more southerly receiver was de-
fined as the zero point for the scatter; typical individual 
points are shown in red, the mean as a black dot at the 
origin, and the 95% containment circle had radius of 4.35 
meters. The performance of the second receiver, approx-
imately 20 feet to the north, is represented in blue (some 
of the blue points obscure red ones). Note that its mean 
falls just where we expected that it would be (the second 
black dot) and the 95% radius is almost the same as the 
first receiver at 4.33 m.  
 
Figure 2 shows the result under the H1 spoofing ex-
periment (meaconing). Now both means appear as a sin-
gle black dot slightly to the north of zero (again, our 
reraditor antenna was somewhat to the north of our de-
fined origin) and the 95% circles are smaller and of 
somewhat different radii. We expect that this difference is 
due to the higher quality of the reradiator antenna, its am-
plification, and that when mounted indoors, one of the 
two test receivers was closer to the reradiator than the 
other.  
 
From the scatter presented it is clear that the means 
of the observations clearly meet our assumptions – accu-
rate under no spoofing and equal under spoofing. We also 
computed sample covariance matrices under both hypoth-
eses. These were  
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and 
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Figure 1 – Sample horizontal scatter under H0. 
 
Figure 2 – Sample horizontal scatter under H1. 
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We observe that many of the elements of these two arrays 
are approximately zero; hence, we propose the following 
simple model for the covariances of our two receiver de-
tector: 
 
 Under H0 the covariance is  
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This simplistic model has all of the components 
being independent and the variances being direc-
tion dependent.  
 
 Under H1 the covariance is  
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In this model the components for each receiver 
are still independent with directionally dependent 
covariances. The covariances across receivers is 
now not zero; specifically, the east, north, and up 
components are correlated. In our sanity check 
data, this correlation coefficient was 0.4.   
 
 
SPOOF DETECTORS 
 
Below we develop and analyze detectors for four dif-
ferent user scenarios with the spoofing model described 
above; primarily we focus on the case of two receivers.  
We note that the independent Gaussian assumption under 
H0 will make the development of the detectors and their 
false alarm analyses tractable. However, the unknown 
statistics (mean and covariance) under H1, even though 
the model assumed is quite simple, make the development 
of an optimum detector impossible. Hence, we develop 
sensible detectors, analyze them under H0 to solve for the 
threshold in terms of the desired/acceptable false alarm 
probability, and then, as possible, consider what happens 
to the detection probability.   
 
 
CASE 1 – KNOWN LOCATIONS 
 
First, we imagine that the location of the two receiv-
ers is precisely known. In that case, the hypotheses are 
 
• H0: the position observation is a Gaussian ran-
dom vector in 6-dimensional space with mean 
vector and covariance matrix  
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• H1: the position observation is a Gaussian ran-
dom vector in a 6-dimensional space with mean 
vector and covariance matrix 
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How should the detector exploit this statistical difference? 
One obvious method is to compute the size (radius 
squared) of the Gaussian ellipsoid about the mean vector 
under H0 that contains the observation point and compare 
this size parameter to a threshold. If the ellipsoid is large, 
then we are likely experiencing spoofing. The resulting 
test is  
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T < λ decide H0 
T > λ decide H1 
 
Beyond being a reasonable test, it uses the knowledge 
of the true positions and is amenable to statistical analysis 
under H0. Specifically, under H0 the test statistic, T, is 
distributed as a chi-squared random variable with 6 de-
grees of freedom. The false alarm probability is then  
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From this expression, the threshold can be found numeri-
cally. For example, λ = 26 yields pfa ≈ 1%. The probabil-
ity of detection, pd, is, in general, intractable due to its 
dependence on ps. We note that it might be possible to do 
a worst case analysis (lowest pd); for simple choices of Σ1 
this might occur if ps is the mean of p1 and p2. Such an 
event is probably not very useful from the perspective of 
the spoofer, however, so a worst case analysis in this case 
appears to be of little use.  
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CASE 2 – KNOWN SEPARATION AND ORIENTA-
TION 
 
Next, imagine that both receivers’ locations have 
some unknown offset, but that the vector difference in the 
locations is known. Said another way, we are assessing 
spoofing on a moving vehicle that has additional sensors 
(e.g. a compass) to indicate orientation. In that case, a 
natural transformation of the observation data is to the 
difference of the observations 
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With this modified data set, the hypotheses are 
 
• H0: dˆ is a 3-dimensional Gaussian random vec-
tor with mean d = p1 – p2 and covariance 2Σ0a 
 
)2,(~ˆ 0aN Σdd  
• H1: dˆ is a 3-dimensional Gaussian random vec-
tor with mean 0 (since the receivers are assumed 
to have equal positions under spoofing) and dif-
ferent covariance  
 
)22,(~ˆ 11 abaN ΣΣ0d   
 
The unknown covariances under H1 still make an opti-
mum test impossible to construct; however, a natural test 
for a difference in mean vectors is to project (under H0) 
the observed difference onto that known difference, so we 
consider  
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(Note that the threshold test is reversed from the normal 
definition; a large projection corresponds to H0.) 
 
As in Case 1, this second test is amenable to statisti-
cal analysis. Specifically, under H0 the test statistic, T, is 
Gaussian distributed  
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It is also Gaussian under H1, but with zero mean and a 
different (and unknown) covariance matrix  
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Using these parameters, we can solve for the false alarm 
probability 
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We can invert this expression to find the threshold 
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and, hence, write the probability of detection as 
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In all of these expression, Q(.) is the usual Gaussian tail 
probability.  
 
As an example of these results, consider the case of a 
horizontal platform (u1 = u2) and equal horizontal 
covariances at the two receivers under H0 
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Then the detector simplifies  
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(Strictly, in this inner product the contribution of the up 
term is zero.) Further, assume under H1 that the 
covariances are  
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then the performance is  
 
  








12
)1(2
1
1
fa
1
0
d
pQ
Qp
d
 
 
Proc. ION ITM, San Diego CA, Jan. 2013
 
 
Figure 3 – Example receiver operating characteristic 
(ROC) curve for Case 2. 
 
 
As a numerical example, let σ1 = σ0 = σ and |d| = 2σ.  
Figure 3 shows the receiver operating characteristic 
(ROC) curve, a plot of the false alarm and detection prob-
abilities as implicit functions of the threshold, for two 
choices of correlation coefficient, 0 and 0.4. Our observa-
tion from this simple example is that any potential (posi-
tive) correlation between the two spoofed receivers im-
proves the ability to detect the spoofer. This performance 
would also improve if the receivers have a greater separa-
tion (larger |d|).  
 
 
CASE 3 – KNOWN SEPARATION ONLY 
 
To lessen the amount of information known to the de-
tection algorithm, imagine that we know only the spacing 
between the receivers’ locations, that the orientation and 
absolute locations are unknown. As in Case 2, we trans-
form the observation data to the difference of the observa-
tions 
21 ˆˆˆ ppd   
 
Without orientation information (and paralleling the con-
cepts introduced in Case 1), our choice for a test statistic 
is the scale of the 3-dimenional ellipsoid (under H0) about 
the origin (the 0 vector) that contains dˆ ; equivalently, the 
distance (under H0) between the two estimated positions.  
If this ellipsoid is small, we decide for a spoofer; if large, 
no spoofer:  
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Under H0 this test statistic is a non-central chi-squared 
random variable with 3 degrees of freedom; the non-
centrality parameter is based on the distance between the 
receivers. Generally under H1 the distribution is intracta-
ble.   
 
To proceed further, once again consider the case of a 
horizontal platform (u1 = u2) with equal horizontal 
covariances under H0  
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(again, the up component of the positions are ignored). 
Equivalently, by multiplying through by 20 , this is  
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or taking the square root, we have an equivalent test on 
the distance between the estimated positions 
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Now, under H0, since the east and north components are 
iid Gaussian, the differences are also Gaussian (with non-
zero means and variances 2 20 ), so T has a Rician distri-
bution. Under H1, if we assume that  
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 then  the differences have zero means and variances equal 
to 21)1(2  , so T is Rayleigh distributed. With these 
assumptions  
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(Q1(.,.) is Marcum’s Q function – see a digital communi-
cations text), λ can be found by numerically inverting this 
expression, and  
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CASE 4 – THREE RECEIVERS 
 
The two receiver formulation above naturally led to 
test statistics based upon the distance between the two 
estimated positions. To extend our spoofing detector con-
cept to more receivers, we keep this focus on inter-
receiver distances. 
 
Rather than pursuing a general result, we continue 
with the assumptions above of a horizontal platform and 
equal horizontal covariances. The test statistic will be the 
sum of the estimated distances between the receivers. For 
three receivers, this is  
'
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in which  
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Again, this distance is expected to be small under spoof-
ing. 
 
A new and significant issue regarding the use of three 
or more receivers to detect spoofing is deciding upon their 
spatial configuration. To start to explore this issue, we 
compare below two setups: a linear configuration and an 
equilateral triangular configuration. These can be seen in 
Figure 4. For comparison’s sake, we will set the inter-
receiver spacing so that the total of the three distances is a 
constant (note that for the linear configuration, this also 
includes the distance between receivers 1 and 3). 
 
 
21 3
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Figure 4 – Configurations of 3 receivers considered:  
linear and triangular. 
 
Even with the simplicity of the assumed statistical 
model, the correlations inherent in the pair wise differ-
ences combined with the squaring and square-root func-
tions make the statistics of the test statistic, T, intractable. 
So, instead, we consider a simple example via simulation. 
Specifically, we scale the receiver spacing so that  
 
0231312 10 ddd  
 
Further, we assume that under H1 we have equal vari-
ances, 20
2
1   , and that the receivers are statistically 
independent, 0 . Figure 5 shows the ROC curve 
based upon a Monte Carlo simulation comparing the two 
receiver configurations. Since a ROC curve that appears 
more toward the upper left of the diagram is better for 
detection, we see that the triangular configuration is better 
than the linear in this example.  
 
 
Figure 5 – ROC curves for 3 receivers in linear and  
triangular configurations by simulation.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
Our goal in this paper was to initiate the analysis of 
GPS spoofing detection methods. While we have chosen a 
simple detection scheme, based upon multiple, spatially 
separated GPS receivers, and have made a number of 
simplifying statistical assumptions in order to proceed, we 
feel that we have achieved that goal and look forward to 
further results on the design and analysis of spoofing de-
tection.  
 
 
FUTURE WORK 
 
As far as we have been able to deduce, this paper 
presents the first statistical analysis of a multi-receiver 
spoofing detection algorithm. To make some initial head-
way on the problem, a number of simplifying assumptions 
have been made; much room for improvement is possible. 
Specifically, we propose that the following extensions 
could be addressed: 
 
 While we assumed independence for mathemati-
cal simplicity, some simple correlation models 
under H0 could be employed; the equal variance 
assumption for the horizontal position variables 
(east and north) could easily be replaced by val-
ues determined from the DOP.  
 
 Further experimentation and analysis effort 
should be expended on selecting realistic models 
for the data under H1; we should try to find the 
worst case choices for ps and Σ1.  
 
 A more general analysis of the 3 receiver case 
should be developed; other arrangements of 3 re-
ceivers should be considered; the case of 4 re-
ceivers in rectangular and diamond-shaped con-
figurations should be considered.   
 
 As some receivers make the pseudoranges them-
selves available, one could develop test statistics 
on them directly; as noted by one audience 
member during the conference, these same tech-
niques could be applied to comparing the phase 
relationship of GPS signals at closely spaced an-
tennas. 
 
 As the proposed tests are “snapshot” methods 
employing just a single set of positions, sequen-
tial tests that exploit the inter-receiver correla-
tions under spoofing, yet allow a decision of “I 
don’t know yet” could be quite effective.  
 
 So far we have assumed a static platform with 
synchronized positions; this should be expanded 
to moving vehicles and time offsets between re-
ceivers.  
 
DISCLAIMER 
 
The views expressed herein are those of the authors and 
are not to be construed as official or reflecting the views 
of the U.S. Coast Guard. 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
[1]  Warner, J. S., and Johnston, R. G., “GPS spoofing 
countermeasures,” Homeland Security Jour., Dec. 
2003. 
[2] Papadimitratos, P., and Jovanovic, A., “GNSS-based 
positioning: attacks and countermeasures,” Proc. 
IEEE MILCOM, Nov. 2008. 
[3] Montgomery, P. Y., Humphreys, T. E., and Ledvina, 
B. M., “Receiver-autonomous spoofing detection: 
experimental results of a multi-antenna receiver de-
fense against a portable civil GPS spoofer,” Proc. 
ION ITM, Jan 2009. 
[4] Ledvina, B. M., Bencze, W. J., Galusha, B. and Mil-
ler, I., “An in-line anti-spoofing device for legacy 
civil GPS receivers,” Proc. ION ITM, Jan. 2010. 
[5] O’Hanlon, B. W., Psiaki, M. L., Humphreys, T. E., 
and Bhatti, J. A., “Real-time spoofing detection in a 
narrow-band civil GPS receiver,” Proc. ION GNSS, 
Sept. 2010. 
[6]  Cavaleri, A., Motella, B., Pini, M., and Fantion, M., 
“Detection of spoofed GPS signals at code and carri-
er tracking level,” Proc. NAVITEC, Dec. 2010.   
[7]  Wesson, K. D., Shepard, D. P., Bhatti, J. A., and 
Humphreys, T. E., “An evaluation of the vestigial 
signal defense for civil GPS anti-spoofing,” Proc. 
ION GNSS, Sept. 2011. 
[8] Daneshmand, S., Jafarnia-Jahromi, A., Broumandon, 
A., and Lachapelle, G., “A low-complexity GPS anti-
spoofing method using a multi-antenna array,” Proc. 
ION GNSS, Sept. 2012. 
[9] Meurer, M., Konovaltsev, A., Cuntz, M. and Hättich, 
C., “Robust joint multi-antenna spoofing detection 
and attitude estimation using direction assisted multi-
ple hypothesis RAIM,” Proc. ION GNSS, Sept. 2012. 
[10] Jafarnia-Jahromi, A., Broumandon, A., Nielsen, J., 
and Lachapelle, G., “GPS vulnerability to spoofing 
threats and a review of antispoofing techniques,” 
Int’l. Jour. Navigation and Observation, 2012. 
[11] Tippenhauer, N. O., Pöpper, C., Rasmussen, K. B., 
and Čapkun, S., “On the requirements for successful 
GPS spoofing attacks,” Proc. ACM CCS, Oct. 2011.   
[12] Nielsen, J., Broumandan, A., and LaChapelle, G., 
“GNSS spoofing detection for single antenna 
handheld receivers,” Navigation, Winter 2011. 
 
 
Proc. ION ITM, San Diego CA, Jan. 2013
